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INSURANCE PROCEEDS UNDER ABANDONED
PROPERTY LAWS*
THROUGH abandoned property laws, states take into custody a wide
variety of unclaimed property which is safeguarded for the rightful owner
and utilized for the community's benefit pending a valid claim.1 The con-
stitutionality of these laws has long been established where they apply only
to liquidated obligations such as bank deposits, 2 stockholder's dividends,'
* Conn. Mutual Life Ins; Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948), reh'g and petition by Can:.
inecticut and Vermont for leave to intervene denied, 334 U.S. 810 (1948).
1. The amount involved is far from insignificant, the 3 year total collected in Now
York alone being over $9,800,000. See note 28 infra. Abandoned property laws are distin.
guishable from escheat statutes which provide for transfer of title, as well as possession, to
the state. See Garrison, Escheats, Abandoned Property Acts, and Their Revenue Aspects, 35
KY.L. REv. 302, 303-306 (1947). The effect, however, is eventually the same, since aban-
doned property statutes may either prohibit claims by the owner against the state after a
number of years, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 7658-34 (Mason, Supp. 1946) (10 years), or provide
that funds in excess of a specified reserve fund shall become the state's absolute property.
E.g., N.Y. STATE FINANCE LAW § 95 (Baldwin, Supp. 1945) ($750,000).
Historically, escheat orignated as an incident of feudal tenure, applying only to realty.
Hardman, The Law of Escheat, 4 L.Q. REv. 318 (1888). Title to personalty passed directly
to the crown by virtue of its prerogative power. 7 HOLDSWORTU, A HISTORY Or ENaIuSH
LAw 495-6 (2d ed. 1937). In the United States, escheat applied to both realty and personalty
and was based on sovereignty rather than tenure. See Matter of People (Melrose Ave,),
234 N.Y. 48, 53, 136 N.E. 235, 237 (1922); cf. I WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW or ADMINISTRA-
TiON *302-11 (importance of escheat as an adjunct to intestacy statutes). Abandoned
property legislation was interjected into this escheat background in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Garrison, supra at 306. It, too, was rooted in the soverign power of the state to take
charge of unclaimed property. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dollar Savings Bank, 259 Pa.
.138, 145, 102 At. 569, 571 (1917). But, unlike escheat, abandoned property legislation
found a further legal justification in the police power protection of the interests of absent
,owners. See cases cited note 2 infra.
The Federal Government has no general escheat power. See Klein v. Brodbeck, 15 F.
Supp. 473, 474 (E.D. Pa. 1934); In re Escheat of Moneys in Custody of United States
Treasury, 322 Pa. 481,484, 186 At. 600, 601 (1936); cf. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 3 (outlawing
forfeiture for treason except during life of person attainted). But Congress, under its ple-
nary power in the territories, has provided for escheat of cegtain alien property there, 24
STAT. 476-7 (1887), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 75-6 (1946), And installments due on federal
insurance or compensation for death or disability are not paid over to a decedent's estate
where escheat under state law would take place, Instead, the award is credited to the ap-
propriation from which it was originally made. 43 STAT. 614 (1924), as amended, 38 U.S.C.
§ 451 (1946); 43 STAT. 625 (1924), asamended, 38 U.S.C. § 514 (1946) (term insurance under
World War Veterans Act). And in one instance the effect achievable by a federal abandoned
property act has apparently been attained without statutory basis, by indefinite retention
of unclaimed funds involved in the liquidation of national banks. See Legis., 26 N.C. L. Rv.
110-11 (1947); A Survey of Statutory Changes in 1V.C. in 1947, 25 N.C.L. REv. 376, 421-3
(1947).
2. E.g., Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944); Security Savings Bank v.
California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923); Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660
(1911). Utility company deposits have been similarly treated. E.g., Brooklyn Borough Gas
Co. v. Bennett, 154 Misc. 106, 277 N.Y. Supp. 203 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
3. E.g., Philadelphia Electric Co. Case, 352 Pa. 457, 43A. 2d 116 (1945).
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and funds paid into court registries. 4 Recently, however, New York and a
few other states have enacted similar statutes applicable to unliquidatcd
and unclaimed obligations due under life insurance contracts.5 These
statutes have been attacked on the ground that the state, by taking over
the proceeds of claims which have not been established or liquidated, un-
constitutionally impairs the insurer's contract rights. But in Conncclicut
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Moore 6 the Supreme Court upheld the New York statute
in the face of such an attack and, in addition, permitted the state to sequester
unclaimed proceeds of policies on the lives of New York residents issued for
delivery in New York by out-of-state insurers.
Under the New York Abandoned Property Law,7 proceeds of insurance
4. United States v. Klein, 303 U.S. 276 (1938) (state may constitutionally echeat
funds in federal court registry); cf. Moufang v. New York, 295 N.Y. 121, 65 N.E. 2d 321
(1946) (state court registry).
5. Pennsylvania enacted the first statute of this kind in 1937. Pa. Laws 1937, No. 403.
p. 2063, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 27, § 434 e seq. (Purdon, Cum. Annual Supp. 1943).
Subsequently, several other states followed suit. 1944: N.Y. AnTDONuED PROP. LAw § 700
(Baldwin, Supp. 1945). 1946: MAss. LAws Am.. c. 175, §§ 149A-D (1943); N.J. SrAT. A.;..
tit. 17 § 34-49 et seg. (Cum. Annual Supp. 1947). 1947: 19 Mica. STAT. A.; . § 26.1053(5)
(Cum. Supp. 1947). Ky. Rnv. STAT. § 393.090 (Baldwin, 1943) may also cover abandoned
insurance proceeds. See Garrison, supra note 1, at 303 n. 41. Connecticut, on the other
hand, specifically exempts certain life insurance proceeds from its general ezcheat statute.
Co-N. GEN. STAT. § 41i (Supp. 1947).
An example of how an abandoned property statute operates is provided by the Pennsyl-
vania statute applicable, inter alia, to abandoned insurance proceeds. PA. Srx'. 21;., tit.
27, §§ 43447 (Purdon, Cum. Annual Supp. 1948): Specified corporations (§ 435) must file
yearly reports with the Department of Revenue listing property subject to the statute.
§ 436. Inquisitorial powers (Q 437) and penalties for failure to comply with thoZe provions
(§ 444) are available as an enforcement aid. The Department notifies indicated owners by
mail and publication that their property has been reported unclaimed (§ 43o), and an index
of such property is available for search. § 439. Upon petition by the Attorney General and
without further notice, the appropriate court may direct payment into the State Treasury.
§ 442. Subsequent proof of legal title enables a claimant to recover securities (§ 443b), or,
if in the form of money, to obtain a refund of his property with 2% interest. § 443a. In ad-
dition, subsequent proof by the transmitting company that the property was not legally
subject to payment into the Pennsylvania Treasury will entitle it to a refund. § 443c. Se
Note, 19 N.C.L. REv. 372 (1941) (constitutional and practical requirements of a good stat-
ute).
6. 333 U.S. 541 (1948), rel;'g and pefition bv Connedicut and Vermont for leare to inler-
rene denied, 334 U.S. 810 (194S), affirming 297 N.Y. 1, 74 N.E.2d 24 (1947).
7. N.Y. ABANDONED PROP. LAW § 700 (Baldwin, Supp. 1945). This law has had an
interesting history. Insurance policies were first subjected to abandoned prop rty provisions
in 1939. N.Y. Laws 1939, c. 923. Although the statute covered all policies regardless of
where the insured resided or where the policies were delivered, it applied only to locally
incorporated companies. Id. § 295. The statute was attacked as unconstitutional and an
injunction pendente lite obtained in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Pink, 102 N. Y. L. J. 2257
(Sup. Ct. Dec. 21, 1939). Before trial, the statute vas amended to apply only to policies of
domestic companies which were issued upon the lives of New Yor: residents (N..Y. Laws
1940, c. 602 § 295), and the case was thereupon discontinued. A 194 amendment extended
1949]
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policies are considered abandoned where (1) matured endowments have
been unclaimed for seven years," or (2) beneficiaries of a deceased insured
have failed to claim proceeds due for seven years,9 or (3) the insured would
have attained the limiting age, under the appropriate mortality table, at
which the insured can collect the face amount of the policy although still
alive.10 In the Connecticut Mutual case, nine insurance companies incor-
porated outside of New York sought a declaratory judgment 11 that the act
was unconstitutional in that satisfaction of contractual conditions such as
proof of death was not required as a prerequisite to state custody, and that
insurers were thus deprived of an opportunity to establish defenses which
might bar or reduce their liability to a beneficiary. 1 The result, plaintiffs
contended, was an impairment of contracts which distinguished New York's
statute from abandoned property laws involving obligations liquidated in
amount.' 3 The Supreme Court, however, dismissed this contention by
analogizing the power of a state under the instant statute to its accepted
power to seize abandoned bank deposits. 14 Disregarding plaintiffs' attempt
to distinguish unliquidated from liquidated obligations, they characterized
this statute to foreign life insurance companies for the first time. N.Y, Laws 1944, c. 497,
§ 1; id. c. 498 § 2. In 1945, a bill was passed to repeal the 1944 amendments and limit juris.
diction, as before, to domestic companies. N.Y. Assembly Introductory No. 2268, Print No.
2551. But Governor Dewey vetoed the bill. Brief for Appellants, p. 49, 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
8. N.Y. ABANDONED PROP. LAw § 700 (1) (a) (Baldwin, Supp. 1945).
9. Id. § 700 (1) (c).
10. This section excludes policies on which transactions have been made within seven
years or on which the corporation has written evidence that the owner knows of the policy.
Id. § 700 (1) (b). The limiting ages under the American Experience Table and the Commlg-
sioners 1941 Standard Ordinary Table are respectively 96 and 100 years. 15 ENcyc. AMER-
ICANA 201d-e (1948 ed.).
11. Plaintiffs also asked for an injunction against threatened enforcement of the stat-
ute. But the Comptroller made an injunction pendente lite unnecessary by withholding en-
forcement pending outcome of the case. Reply Brief for Appellants, p. 8, Conn. Mutual I'Ife
Ins. Co. v. Moore, 297 N.Y. 1, 74 N.E. 2d 24 (1947).
12. In the lower court, plaintiffs also attacked the statute on the ground that they were
deprived of the defense of the statute of limitations, but they did not attempt to argue this
point in the United States Supreme Court. Perhaps they decided that their argument was
foreclosed by Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 316 (1945) (". . . lifting
the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is
[not] per se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment").
13. Plaintiffs relied on U.S. CONsT. Art. 1, § 10, as interpreted in Green v. Biddle, 8
Wheat. 1, 83 (U.S. 1823) ("The objection to a law, on the ground of its impairing the
obligation of a contract, can never depend upon the extent of the change which the law
effects in it. Any deviation from its terms, by ...imposing conditions not expressed In
the contract, or dispensing with the performance of those which are, however minute, or
apparently immaterial, in their effect upon the contract of the parties, impairs its obliga-
tion."). This interpretation is far from dormant. Cf. Worthen Co, v. Thomas, 292 U.S.
426 (1934); see Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397,409 (1930).
14. 333 U.S. 541,546, 547 (1948).
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the differences between claiming insurance proceeds and withdrawing
deposits as mere contractual variations in the collection process. 5
Perhaps plaintiffs' contentions should not be dismissed so cavalierly,
for on a legalistic level the analogy relied upon by the Court is far from
perfect: unlike the obligations of a bank where demand deposits are in-
volved,16 the insurer's liability is contingent upon performance of stipulat&l
conditions precedent.' 7 But vitiation of these conditions is unconstitutional
only if the consequent impairment of contractual rights causes injury to the
insurer which cannot be justified in the reasonable exercise of the state's
police power. 8 Considered from this standpoint, the Court's decision seems
eminently sound.
No substantial injury to insurers results from statutory removal of the
possibility that a claimant might not be able to prove compliance with a
condition precedent to liability, such as proof of death or survival until
maturity.'9 In the case of matured endowments, :° the first class of proceeds
15. Id. at 547. It has been settled since Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone,
221 U.S. 660 (1911), that the state may enforce its claim to abandoned bank deposits with-
out presenting the passbook required of a private claimant by the contract of depozit. The
close parallel of such provisions to the condition that a claimant surrender an insurance
policy before receiving its proceeds probably dissuaded plaintiffs from pre-sing an argument
that the state should be bound by this condition. And there is no danger that presentation
of the policy by a claimant after payment to the state would subject the insurer to double
liability. See note 32 infra.
16. E.g., Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 241,242, 248 (1944) (deposits
are debtor obligations of the bank, payable on demand).
17. Due proofs of death, age and (as to endowments) survival until maturity are re-
quired by the terms of the policies as a prerequisite to payment. Brief for Appellants, p. 3,
333 U.S. 541 (1948). These requirements are designed to give insurers a basis for intelli-
gently estimating their liability. Lampert v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 23 F.
Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. N.Y. 1939), aff'd mrzn., 107 F. 2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1939), cerl. deried, 309
U.S. 663 (1940). They are particularly valuable as a means of protection against fraudulent
claims. See VANcE, HLNDBoOK OF TH LAW OF IsUr.cE 337-8 (2d ed. 1930), and note
27 infra. But see p. 632 and note 29 infra.
18. Home Bld'g &Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Worthen Co. v. Thomas,
292 U.S. 426 (1934) apparently limited the exercise of police power in this regard to instances
where an emergency existed or the impairment was only temporary. But this limitation has
been progressively eaten away. E.g., Gelfert v. Nat. City Bank, 313 U.S. 221, 235 (1941)
(no emergency); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bld'g & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 39-40 (1940) (par-
manent impairment).
There are two legal rationales by which courts justify impairment of the obligations of
contract: (1) the right of the state to exercise protective powers is an implied condition of
every contract (Home Bld'g & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, supra at 435), and (2) the police
power is paramount to rights between individuals under contract. East Ne, York Savings
Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-3 (1945). Both are applicable to insurance contracts.
Kindleberger v. Lincoln Nat. Bank, 155 F. 2d 281, 286(D.C.Cir. 1946), cert. denic, 329 L.S.
803 (1947); cf. Att'y Gen. v. Provident Institution for Savings, 201 Mass. 23, 26, 86N.E.912.
913 (1909) (implied condition rationale applied to bank deposits).
19. Plaintiffs also included proof of age as a condition precedent (see note 17 supra),
but nowhere specified the reason why they classified it as such. Rather, misstatement of
age is an affirmative defense on which the insurer, not the beneficiary, bears the burden of
19491
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which can be sequestered under the statute, the only condition to be estab.
lished by a claimant is proof of survival-evidence relevant only to the issue
of vho may claim the proceeds; it does not affect the amount of an insurer's
liability, which is already fixed. 21 In the second class, life policies merely
awaiting the claim of a beneficiary, insistance on the condition precedent of
proof of death would usually be meaningless: by definition the statute applies
only where death of the insured has already been verified by the companies."
And in the third category, where the insured would have attained the limit-
ing age under the mortality table,23 any possibility that liability could not
be established is minimized by numerous presumptions 24 which enable
skeletal proof of death 25 to constitute compliance with the contract.25
proof. Silberman v. Wash. Nat. Ins. Co., 329 Ill. App. 448, 69 N.E. 2d 519 (1946), see
VAN E, op. cit. supra note 17 at 963-5 (reproducing a typicallife insurance policy). Bilt cf.
Hervitz v. New York Life Ins.'Co., 160 Pa. Super. 496,52 A. 2d 368 (1947) (claimant pleaded
age rather than relying on the presumption and thus invited the burden of proving the issue).
See note 27 infra.
20. See p. 630 supra.
21. The face amount of an endowment policy is paid to the insured if he survives and
to the beneficiary if the insured dies before maturity. HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCV 95 (1925).
There is a so-called "pure endowment" in which nothing is paid unless the holder lives until
maturity. What the disposition of such a policy would be under the statute does not appear.
Plaintiffs did not argue the point, probably because such policies are relatively rare. Id. at
171.
22. N.Y. ABANDONED PROP. LAW § 700 (1) (c) (Baldwin, Supp. 1944).
23. See note 10 supra.
24. E.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 143 F. 2d 726 (5th Cir. 1944), cerl. denied,
323 U.S. 760 (1944) (proof of seven years' unexplained absence complies with due proof of
death clause); Cutrell v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 145 Neb. 550, 17 N.W. 2d 465
(1945) (presumption against death by suicide or murder); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Meade, 281 Ky. 36, 134 S.W. 2d 960 (1939) (habits and character remain the same); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 154 Okla. 244, 7 P. 2d 440 (1932) (answers in application are
not fraudulent). These presumptions do not deny due process. E.g., Mobile, J.&X.C. R.R,
v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
25. E.g., Bernstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 139 Me. 388, 34 A. 2d 682 (1943)
(death may be proved by circumstantial evidence even where policy stipulates proof of
actual death); Kundiger v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 218 Minn. 273, 15 N.W. 2d 487
(1944) (substantial compliance is sufficient); Apfelbaum v. Prudential Ins. Co., 12 Misc, 62
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 169 Atl. 677 (1933) (no proofs filed at all, but company had all
the information that claimant had); McCaffry v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 261 App, Div.
452, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 926 (2d Dep't 1941) aff'd 287 N.Y. 704 (1942) (blanks In forms which
seek to elicit cause, as distinguished from circumstances, of death may be ignored); Hanra-
han v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 143 Pa. Super. 557, 18 A. 2d 512 (1941) (due
proof need not be in any particular form, or strongest or best proof available, as long as
essential facts on which insurer's liability depends are given). Even though compliance with
proof of loss is stipulated as a condition precedent, courts may excuse non-compliance.
Hulme v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 60 Ga. App. 65, 2 S.E. 2d 750 (1939).
See Note, Due Proof of Death in Life and Accident Insurance Policies, 28 IowA L, Rvv. 683
(1943).
26. Moreover, an alternative to proof of death in this third category is proof that the
insured individual actually attained the limiting age under the mortality table. Either
event brings the policy to maturity and crystallizes the insurer's liability. See Life Ins, News
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In an effort to lend an aura of significance to their conditions precedent,
plaintiffs alleged that a claimant's proof of death might uncover facts lead-
ing to various defenses which otherwise could not be established.- This
argument, however, assumes not only that claims would be made but also
that the basic facts presented by the claimants would lead to defenses. _x-
cept where this double-barreled hypothesis would become a reality in the
absence of state sequestration of the proceeds, the insurer has not been
injured. Yet experience indicates that no claim will ever be made -3 or
defense established 2 to the vast majority of abandoned policies.
Data, Nov. 24, 1948, col. S. (50 life insurance policy holders over 95 years old will them-
selves collect for the face amount on policies maturing for age in 1949).
27. Brief for Appellants, p. 4, Conn. lutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541
(1948) ("Since no one knows whether the insured is living or dead, or if dead, when or how
he died, it is impossible to know or determine the amount of liability, if any, in the abzence
of the due proofs required by the terms of the policies."). See the due proof of accidental
death provision quoted in Lampert v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 28 F. Supp. 142,
143 (E.D. N.Y. 1939), aff'd nme., 107 F. 2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1939), carl. denied, 309 U.S. 653
(1940).
Death under a circumstance excepted by the policy is particularly susceptible to dis-
covery from claimant's proof of death. See, e.g., Eggena v. New York Life Ins. Co., 236
Iowa 262, 18 NA. 2d 530 (1945) (military service); Hembree v. American Ins. Union, 121
Kan. 271, 246 Pac. 683 (1926) (pregnancy); Washington v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 157 So.
162 (La. App. 1934) ("resisting officers of the law"); Honrath v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
65 S.D. 480, 275 N.W. 258 (1937) (suicide). Fraudulent misstatements or breach of policy
provisions may also be ascertained. E.g., Sortito v. Prudential Ins. Co., 103 Conn. 163, 142
At. SOS (1928) (good health when policy issued); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Plunkett,
129 Okla. 292, 264 Pac. 827 (1928) (insanity); Gardocki v. Polish Nat. Alliance, 141 Pa.
Super. 53, 14 A. 2d 604 (1940) (intemperance).
Another defense which may be uncovered is misstatement of age by the insured. See note
19 supra. If established, it reduces the amount of liability. N.Y. INS.UMUc LaW § 155
(1) (d) (Baldwin, Supp. 1941); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Veit, 294 N.Y. 222, 62 N.E.2d 45
(1945) (reduction from $25,000 to $15,077). The insurer must overcome a presumption,
however, that the age stated in the policy is correct. Goell v. United State Life Ins. Co.,
265 App. Div. 735,40 N.Y.S. 2d 779 (Ist Dep't 1943).
28. In the years 1945-7, New York received from all sources a total of 9,S67,034.26
into its abandoned property fund, more than 96 percent of which has never been reclaimed
from the state. See REP. COMPTROLLER 105-6 (N.Y. 1945); id. at 107-8 (1946); id. at 113-14
(1947). Receipts from locally incorporated insurance companies, the only ones covered in
the statute until the present case, in the same years totaled $287,094.09. Id. at 106 (1945);
id. at 108 (1946); id. at 114 (1947).
29. The obstacles to a successful defense are imposing. Recognizing that insurance
companies have primary control over the terms of their contracts, courts have strictly inter-
preted the wording against insurers. WILLSTON .uw THomPsoN, SELECTiONS rROM WIlLIS-
TON'S Co.ra.Rcrs 494, 644 (rev. ed. 1938); see, e.g., Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 284
U. S. 489, 492 (1932) (rule conversely stated as one of liberal construction in claimant's
favor). In addition, courts have sought to limit defenses by presumption such as thoe listed
in note 24 supra. And burden of proof presents another obstacle: although the claimant
ordinarily has the burden of proving compliance with proof of death as part of his prima
facie case, Howe v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 321 Mass. 283, 72 N.E. 2d 425 (1947), the breach of
any particular condition then becomes an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and
proved by the insurer. E.g., Tkatch v. Knights & Ladies of Security, 264 Pa. 578, 107 Ad.
19491
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Only rarely, therefore, does the statute actually deprive insurance com-
panies of an opportunity to ferret out defenses which they have not already
discovered. And where they do have present defenses, there is no require-
ment that the proceeds be handed over to the state." Nor is there danger
that the companies will in fact lose money on the policies. They have already
had the profitable use of the premiums for substantially longer than if the
proceeds had been promptly claimed. 31 Moreover, a discharge granted by
the state relieves the company of liability to a subsequent claimant. 82
Thus the only substantial impact upon the insurers is that they are not
permitted to retain the windfall-a result which is indeed the objective of
all abandoned property laws. The companies contended that the profit
created by an owner's failure to claim his property should inure to the
benefit of other policyholders.33 But no reason is apparent why insurance
policyholders should be entitled to benefits which their counterparts,
890 (1919). But cf. Bennett v. Royal Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 232 Mo. App. 1027, 112
S.W. 2d 134 (1938) (by alleging circumstances under which premiums were paid, claimant
assumed burden of proof on question of lapse).
One expert predicts that this trend is increasing: "The future litigation of insurance
claims will . . . turn more upon the substantive merits or defects of the claim and les
upon technical breaches of condition which sometimes concealed the real issues in contro-
versy." Patterson, Insurance, 8 SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW 37 (P.L.I. Pam,
1946).
30. This interpretation of the statute was made by the New York court in the instant
case: "The plaintiff companies . .. cannot resist payment . . . because of (1) the Statute
of Limitations or (2) noncompliance with policy provisions calling for due proof of death or
of other designated contingency or (3) failure to surrender a policy. Except for these re-
strictions, however, the statute (§ 700) leaves any of the plaintiff companies wholly free to
set up any complete or partial defense . . ." Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 297N,Y.1,
10-11, 74 N.E. 2d 24, 27-28 (1947). On appeal, plaintiffs abandoned arguments based on
the statute of limitations and policy surrender requirements. See notes 12 and 15 supra.
31. Under the New York statute, seven years is the minimum of extra time during
which the insurer has use of the premiums. See page 630 supra. In two of the three classi-
fications, where endowments have matured and where the limiting age has been reached, the
companies actually make a profit since they hold the premiums for a longer time than is
necessary to accumulate the face amount of the policy. These gratuities should more than
offset the conjectural possibility that the insurer might have uncovered a valid defense to an
abandoned policy if the state had not taken the proceeds into custody.
32. N.Y. ABANDONED PROPERTY LAW § 1404 (2) (Baldwin, Supp. 1943); cf. Security
Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923) (payment to the state in obedience to a
valid abandoned property law discharges an obligor). New York has a provision which
allows an insurer who nevertheless pays a claimant to acquire the claimant's rights against
the state. N.Y. ABANDONED PROPERTY LAW § 707 (Baldwin, Supp. 1947).
33. Brief for Appellants p.25, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). Since the bulk of life insurance Is
carried in mutual companies, 15 ENcYc. AMERICANA 196 (1948 ed.), policyholders would
usually receive the windfall as an item of profit payable, for example, in the form of a deduc-
tion from premiums or a paid-up addition to their policies. See N.Y. INsuRANcE LA W § 216
(2) (Baldwin, Supp. 1941) Holders of participating policies in stock companies would sim-




mutual bank depositors 34 or utility company stockholders,5 have already
been denied by decisions upholding other abandoned property laws.
In realistic terms, therefore, the Supreme Court was correct in treating
insurance proceeds identically with bank deposits. There is no reason why
the public should not be the beneficiary in both instances. The state's
custodial power justifies the initial act of taking the proceeds away from the
companies to hold for potential claimants." And a windfall resulting from
subsequent failure of claimants to materialize is in the nature of ownerless
property which the state is entitled to retain.-
While no dissenting voice was raised to the merits of the decision on im-
pairment of contractual rights, three justices felt that no declaratory judg-
ment at all should be issued in view of their uncertainty as to whether New
York possessed constitutional power to take over proceeds held by foreign
insurance companies. As construed by the state court, the statute embraced
all abandoned policies issued for delivery in New York on the lives of persons
then resident there.3s Refusing to rule on its entire scope, however, the
majority confined its decision to instances where both the insured and bene-
ficiaries continued to reside in New York until the policy matured. Six
Justices agreed that in this hypothetical situation New York had "sufficient
contact with the transaction" to justify its intervention. But three Jus-
tices balked at even this limited holding.-' Their primary ground was the
34. E.g., Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660, 665 (1911) (fact
that mutual despositors on dissolution of the institution share abandoned funds left in the
bank does not require that the state refrain from taking such funds into custody); Greenough
v. Peoples Savings Bank, 38 R.I. 100, 94,At. 706 (1915).
35. E.g., Philadelphia Electric Co. Case, 352 Pa. 457, 43 A. 2d 116 (1945) (abandoned
stock).
36. Protection of an absentee's property under the police power is the ba± for all aban-
doned property legislation. See note I and cases cited note 2 supra; Garrison, sura note 1,
at 310; cf. Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911); Cunnius v. Reading School District, 193 U.S.
458 (1905).
Other countries exercise similar powers. See Cunnius v. Reading School District, supra
at 469-71 (discussing law of France, Germany and England).
37. The fundamental principle behind both escheat and abandoned proparty laws is
the feeling that the community at large should profit from a windfall rather than an in-
dividual or a limited group of stock or policy holders. See I; re Harrisburg Bridge Co., 33
Pa. D.&C. 657, 661-2 (1940), and note I supra.
38. The terms of the statute cover any policy issued on the life of a New Yor1: resident.
N.Y. ABANDONED PRoP. LAW § 700 (Baldvin, Supp. 1945). But the New York Supreme
Court declared the act invalid ". . . in so far as it purports to apply to policies written out-
side of the state by foreign companies . . ." upholding it only as to policies L-sued for
delivery in New York. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mloore, 187 Misc. 1004, 1016, 65 N.Y.S.
2d 143, 155 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd iem., 271 App. Div. 1002, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 323 (Ist Dep't
1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 1, 74 N.E. 2d, 24 (1947), aff'd, 333 U.S. 541 (1943).
39. 333 U.S. 541,548-50 (1948).
40. Mr. Justice Douglas joined in a dissent written by Mr. Justice Jackson. rd. at 556.
While indicating substantial agreement with this opinion, Mr. Justice Fran:furter elaborated
on his own views in a separate dissent. Id. at 551.
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potential conflict with statutes which, like that of Pennsylvania, assert
power to take proceeds into custody on bases such as domicil of the in-
surer.4 1 Thus, if a policy issued by a Pennsylvania insurer should fall within
the scope of the New York statute as approved by the Connecticut Mutual
decision, abandoned proceeds would be subject to the claims of both states.4
To hold that New York had "sufficient contacts," the dissenting Justices
contended, placed the Court in a dilemma. Consistency would require either
judicial denial of Pennsylvania's power to enforce its statute despite equally
close "contacts," or unconstitutional imposition of double liability on in-
surers.
43
This argument, however, neglects the possibility of sanctioning a race of
diligence among states having "sufficient contacts." 41
Admittedly, such a race has practical disadvantages: if a premium were
placed on diligence, each legislature would seek to take proceeds into custody
after a shorter waiting period than its rivals, 45 and the ensuing confusion
should result in extensive litigation 41 as well as conflicting claims against
the insurers.47 But since these difficulties become acute only when con-
flicting claims are numerous, the Connecticut Mutual decision presents no
practical obstacle to upholding the Pennsylvania statute. Rarely could
New York establish continued residence by both insured and beneficiaries of
out-of-state policies.
Nor does the Connecticut Mutual decision present any theoretical obstacle
to validating the Pennsylvania type of statute. The criterion of this statute,
41. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 27, § 434 et seg. (Purdon, Cum Annual Supp. 1947); ef. MAss,
LAws ANN. c. 175, §§ 149 A-D (1948); N.J. STAT. ANN., tit. 17, §§ 34-49 (cum. Annual Supp,
1947).
42. An intermediate basis, potentially conflicting with that of both New York and
Pennsylvania, is utilized by the Michigan statute. 19 MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.1053(1)-(66)
(Cum Supp. 1947). Like New York, Michigan seeks certain policies of foreign insurers.
§ 26.1053(5)a. But any resemblance to either New York or Pennsylvania ceases there, for
Michigan takes custody of the proceeds on the basis of the "owner's" (§ 26.1053(5)c) res-
idence without regard to any other factor. Foreign companies doing business in Michigan
must report the property of an owner whose last known address indicated a Michigan res-
idence. § 26.1053 (6). Thus, a Pennsylvania policy may be subject to claim by Pennsylvania
on the basis of the insurer's domicile, by New York on the basis of issuance for delivery and
residence of the insured, and by Michigan on the basis of the owner's last residence,
43. 333 U.S. 541, 560 (1948).
44. Under this alternative, the state first procuring the proceeds would retain them in
full, subject to possible allocation among claiming states through agreement, arbitration,
or otherwise.
45. Too short a period might have the unfortunate consequence of encouraging efforts
of claimants to avert defenses by "disappearing" until after the state has taken proceeds into
custody and then asserting their claim, free from defenses, against the state.
46. Particularly would this be true where factors as difficult to establish as "issuance
for delivery" and "residence" of the insured and beneficiaries constitute the basis of one
state's claim.
47. In addition to this burden the insurance companies could be required to procesn
records and reports for whatever states alleged jurisdiction over their policies.
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location of the insurer's home office,," satisfies the test of "sufficient con-
tacts" more than any other basis of custodial power: the entire insurance
transaction centers, 49 and the proceeds are located, " in the state of the home
office. Thus, a stringent definition of "sufficient contacts" would preserve
the Pennsylvania statute, establishing a basis on which every policy could be
reached by some state. At the same time, such a definition could bar statutes
based on less substantial grounds and thereby obviate all but a few con-
flicting claims.51
Now that it has been authoritatively determined that unclaimed insurance
proceeds may be treated as an item of abandoned property, expansion of
general statutes to encompass this source of non-tax revenue can be ex-
pected. Although the Connecticut Mutual opinions afford little guidance as
48. "Home office" of the insurer does not signify mere technical domicile consisting
solely of a post-office box in some state with favorable incorporation laws. Factually in-
surance companies bear a far more significant relationship to their incorporating state. Se
note 49 infra. Pennsylvania relies on this "home office" criterion, since its statute embraces
all insurers incorporated and doing business under the Commonwealth's laws. PA. STAT.
A/,N., tit. 27, § 435 (Purdon, Cum. Annual Supp. 1943).
49. See Conn. 'Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 187 Misc. 1004, 1009-10, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 143,
148-9 (1946): ". .. [Tihe business of plaintiffs is conducted from their Home Offices,
located in the states of their incorporation, where their officers, records, and securitie3 are
situated; .. . applications . . . [are considered and approved, and) policies are written
at the Home Offices and sent to the agents for delivery to the applicants. Premiums are
payable at the Home Offices, or, if paid to agents, are forwarded to the Home Offices. No-
tices as to premiums coming due and as to policy loans, interest on policy loans, lapan, etc.,
are mailed from the Home Offices. Loans on policies are considered and made at the Home
Offices, and loan checks are drawn at the Home Offices and mailed to the policy holders, or
to agents for delivery to policy holders. 'Claims under policies must be made at the Home
Offices, under the terms of the policies, which provide that upon receipt at the Home Office
of 'due proof' of death, or other event, the company will pay, etc., and all claims are con-
sidered at the Home Offices, and, if allowed pursuant to the terms of the policiks, are paid
by checks drawn at the Home Offices.'" The convergence of such numerous contacts
within one jurisdiction is an important consideration in view of the uniformity objectives
behind conflict of laws rules. See Harper, Policy Bases of tlx Conflict of Laws, 56 YALE L.J.
1155,1163-4(1947).
50. Situs of the abandoned property is the usual criterion of state dominion. See cas
cited note 2 supra. Domicile of the owner was specifically rejected in favor of actual do-
minion over the res as a basis for escheat in In re Rapoport's Estate, 317 Mich. 291, 26 N.11.
2d 777 (1947). Contra: In re Lyons' Estate 175 Wash. 115, 26 P.2d 615 (1933), criticized in
47 HAv. L. REv. 872 (1934).
In United States v. Klein, 303 U.S. 276 (1938), funds held in the United States District
Court in Pennsylvania were declared a proper subject for escheat by Pennsylvania. Since
the funds had already been deposited with the U.S. Treasury, it might be argued that a mere
constructive presence was sanctioned. It is clear, however, that the district court had con-
trol of the funds as a credit in its registry and that the circuit court conceived of the actual
situs as Pennsylvania. 106 F. 2d 213 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denicd, 308 U.S. 618 (1939).
51. The New York statute, except as to the limited situation approved by the instant
case, might well be invalidated on this ground. See page 635 supra. For discussion of the
innumerable factors on which statutes might be based, see Mr. Justice JacL-on's dizzent, 333
U.S. 541,558-9 (1948).
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